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Abstract: According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view
faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne 2002, 2006, Braddon-Mitchell, 2004): if no-futurism is true, how
do  you  know you  are  present?  I  shall  propose  a  new  skeptical  argument  based  on  the  physical
possibility  of  Gödelian  worlds  (1949).  This  argument  shows  that  a  no-futurist  has  to  endorse  a
metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But
then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-
futurist world?
Introduction
One of the main debates in the metaphysics of time deals with the existence of past and future
entities. According to presentists, present entities possess the ontological privilege of existence whereas
past  and  future  ones  do  not  (see  Bigelow  1996,  Bourne  2006,  Markosian  2004,  Merricks  1999,
Zimmerman 1998). On the contrary, eternalists (see Lewis 1986, Quine 1960, Sider 2001) claim that
past and future entities exist to the same extent. Here is an intermediate position: no-futurism (also
called the growing block view). According to this theory, past and present entities exist whereas future
entities do not (see Broad 1923, Tooley 1997, Button 2006, 2007). This theory seems attractive because
it allows for the truth-making of past-tensed statements while accounting for the openness of the future,
given that there are no truth-makers for future-tensed statements.
Eternalism and presentism have symmetrical advantages and drawbacks. The first can easily
give an account of what are the truth-makers of past statements. Truth-makers of these statements are
just some parts of eternity understood as space-time. For example, if I say "Yesterday it was raining",
this statement is true because there is a temporal part of reality (reality as it was yesterday) that makes
it true. 
But  an  eternalist  has  some  worries  when  she  has  to  account  of  our  intuition  that  future
contingent facts are unsettled, because she holds that future objects exist as well as present ones. For
instance, if I say "tomorrow it is going to rain", this statement seems to have a truth value now, because
the fact making it true exists as a part of space-time. It exists simpliciter independently of the temporal
location of the speaker asserting that “tomorrow it is going to rain”.
The presentist has to deal with opposite problems: if she can explain that contingent future facts
are unsettled (because the future does not exist), it is difficult for her to find truth-makers for past
statements when she assesses that the past does not exist. She can explain that the statement "tomorrow
it is going to rain" does not have a truth value because it does not have a truthmaker: there is not a part
of reality (the future at the date of tomorrow) that exists. If you are a presentist there is nothing making
this statement true or false. But by refusing the existence of the world at the date of yesterday, there is
no truthmaker for a statement like "yesterday it was raining". So presentism and eternalism have both
to deal with symmetrical difficulties.
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For these reasons,  no-futurism seems attractive.  By postulating that past  and present  things
exist,  but  that  future  ones  do  not,  it  is  supposed  to  have  the  advantages  of  both  eternalism and
presentism without their drawbacks. This view offers the possibility to both account for truth making of
past statements and to explain the openness of the future, by saying that contingent future facts are not
settled. It is true that yesterday it was raining because the part of the world at the date of yesterday
exists, whereas it is not true (and neither false) that tomorrow it is going to rain because the part of the
world  at  the  date  of  tomorrow  does  not  exist.  Unfortunately,  no-futurism  suffers  from  serious
difficulties.
2. The Presents
Another debate about time concerns the existence or not of a passage of time (or in time).
According to the A-theory, things are passing in time, independently of our perceptions, by the dynamic
power of A-properties: the properties of being past, present and future (see for instance Zimmerman
2008).  Things  are  first  future,  then  they  are  present,  and after  that  they are  past.  This  implies  a
metaphysical distinction between past,  present and future.  The property of being present would be
moving in  space-time by applying successively to  different  slices  of  this  space-time.  An object  is
present if it is located in the only slice that owns the transitory property of being present. No-futurism
implies the A-theory because it stipulates a transitory property of being present: the property of being at
the edge of the four dimensional space-time composed by the past and the present. For the sake of
clarity, let us name the conjunction of the A-theory and no-futurism the growing block theory.
The growing block theory seems to imply another sense, indexical this time, of what it is for an
object to be present. When past and present facts have obtained, they exist. So the people in the past
can assert that they are present from their own point of view. A thing could be said to be present for a
speaker if it  is simultaneous with a speaker who refers to it.  To be present for a fact is just to be
simultaneous with the statement that expresses it. The adjective "present" is just an indexical term that
picks up a relation of simultaneity between two facts: a physical fact (for instance the fact that it is
raining today) and a speech act (for instance the statement "it is raining today"). 
A first argument against no-futurism is that, to the contrary of presentism (the fact of being
present is an objective fact) and eternalism (the fact of being present is merely an indexical fact), this
theory has to postulate two extremely different ways of being present. Hence, it does not respect the
principle of ontological parsimony. Of the three theories only two of them (presentism and eternalism)
can describe in an indexical way or in an objective way what it is to be present. Here is why.
Eternalists and presentists can use the two concepts of being present, but these two concepts
apply to  one and only one time (the objective time of  the presentist,  or the indexical  time of  the
eternalist). Let us start with the presentist. If the present is objective for the presentist, it is possible for
her to do an indexical analysis of what it is to be present. But this analysis can be realized only in the
present,  because  present  is  the  only  time  that  exists.  So,  assuming  presentism,  if  something  is
indexically  present  it  is  necessarily objectively present  too.  In  presentism,  indexical  and objective
definitions of the present pick up the very same time.
For an eternalist  the present is an indexical notion that expresses a relation of simultaneity.
There is no other sense of what it is to be present. So, assuming eternalism, to be objectively present is
precisely to be indexically present. Hence, both presentism and eternalism have only one way to be
present, even if it is possible to describe this present both in an indexical way and in an objective way.
On the contrary, for the growing block theorist, the two concepts do not target the same slices of space-
time. Times picked up by the concept of "objective present" are just a subset of the times picked up by
the concept of "indexical present". One could object that the growing block theorist could just abandon
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the indexical present sense. But then, how is she going to describe the fact that past people believe to
be present? They are real and so are their beliefs. They surely (and wrongly) believe to be present
objectively because they are indexically present. Here one could object that it is a misleading way to
describe what is going on here. It is not true that past people believe to be present. They believed to be
present. However, unless one wants to postulate a special property applying to the past, there is no
metaphysical difference between the past and the present. Hence, from our present point of view, there
is nothing wrong to say that over there in the past, people believe to be present. This is just to say that
there is an instant  t from when people believe(d) to be present. Using past tense will not save our
problem here. Hence, the growing block theorist cannot drop this indexical sense of being present. It
follows that the ontological price of no-futurism is high in comparison of presentism and eternalism.
In the growing block theory the problem is not that there are two ways to describe the present,
the problem is that there are two radically different ways of being present. For example it is possible of
being both past and present. It is possible to be present in the indexical sense by being located at a time
t of the block while being past in the objective sense because this time  t is not at the edge of the past-
present  block,  at  the  edge  of  the  growing  space-time.  However,  ontological  parsimony  will  not
convince everybody. But the more serious worry for a no-futurist is not the two presents in themselves,
but a skeptical challenge it leads to. 
3. A First Skeptical Challenge
The challenge was raised by Bourne (2002, 2006) and Braddon-Mitchell (2004). It proceeds by
asking to the growing block defender: "how do you know that now (in the indexical sense) is now (in
the objective sense)? In other words how do you know that you are present in the objective sense and
not only in the indexical sense?“. Indeed you have to justify that you are objectively present if you
want to justify the openness of the future.
As Craig Bourne (2006) emphasizes, if Socrates is in the past of the block past-present, he has
of  course the same intuition as  we have about  the openness  of  the future.  Hence,  a  belief  in  the
openness of the future is not able to root the real openness of the future. So it is impossible for us to
know whether  our  belief  that  we are  objectively present  is  true or  false,  and whether  the present
expressed  in  an  indexical  way  corresponds  to  the  objective  present.  Maybe  are  we  in  the  same
epistemic situation as Socrates, believing that we are objectively present when we are not. How do you
know that you are not lost in a distant past?
You have to remind the interest of the growing block theory: it is supposed to have both the
advantages  of  eternalism to  account  for  truth  values  of  past  statements,  and  the  advantages  of  a
presentist theory in accounting for the openness of the future. But because we do not know whether our
future is open, what is the interest to secure an openness of an objective future? It seems to be useless
for the metaphysician to show that the objective future is open, if it is impossible to show that our own
future is open, in other words if it is impossible to show that our future match the objective future. One
of the main interests of no-futurism is to account for an asymmetry of openness between the past and
the future, and to secure a specificity of the present. So if the skeptic objection is right, no-futurism is
not able to do what it was developed for.
One could ask why exactly we should care about a match between our own future and the real
future. Why not just bite the bullet: we do not know whether we are living in the past. This move is
indeed available to the no-futurist but it comes with a serious price. It implies to abandon a common
knowledge: we are living in the present. This is a common fact. If no-futurism is true, then it is only a
belief,  not  a  knowledge.  In  comparison,  presentism  and  eternalism  do  not  threaten  this  basic
knowledge. Presentism ensures a match between indexical and objective presents (an indexical analyse
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can merely be made in  the objective  present),  and eternalism defines  the  objective present  as  the
indexical present. But again, one could ask why exactly we should care about common facts. Is this not
commonplace to doubt about common facts in metaphysics? Surely, but there are rules to do that.
The growing block view aims at explaining some facts: the settled past, and the open future.
“Tomorrow it is going to rain” is not true or false, because there do not exist a part of space-time that
makes it true. But this is precisely what shows the skeptical challenge: we do not know whether there
exists a part of space-time that makes this statement true. Hence, the growing block view might explain
the truth values of past statements, but it cannot explain the lack of truth values for future statements
except by claiming that they lack truth values because we do not know the future.  But absolutely
everybody agrees on the fact that we do not know the future. The presentist agrees. The eternalist
agrees. The dispute is not about the epistemic openness of the future. It is about the metaphysical
openness of the future. And what we call  the future is our future. The term “future” refers to what is
located after where we are located in time. And the no-futurist cannot ensure that this future, our future,
is unreal. She fails to explain what she was supposed to explain, the openness our future. Hence, the
no-futurist cannot escape the skeptical challenge. 
Some philosophers have tried to answer it. I will examine two of these answers, one from Peter
Forrest and another one from Tim Button. Forrest (2004) says that only the speakers objectively present
are conscious and alive, and that this is that consciousness that let us know we are objectively present.
So to the skeptical question “how do you know you are objectively present?” Forrest answers “because
you know you are conscious and alive”. He calls this the Past is Dead hypothesis. 
Heathwood  (2005) has  proposed an objection  to  the  Past  is  Dead hypothesis  but  has  been
answered by Forrest  (2006) and I will  chose a different path to argue against it.  The Past is Dead
hypothesis implies that there is something wrong with the past. It is a no-futurist hypothesis that the
past exist. Hence, the inhabitants of the past exist while not being conscious1. Speakers localized in the
past would be zombies in the philosophical sense of David Chalmers (1996). It implies not only that
zombies are metaphysically possible,  but that they exist  in the actual world.  Actually,  most of the
inhabitants of space-time would be zombies: this hypothesis seems very expansive and a bit unlikely.
More of that, the skeptical challenge would only be moved because "How do you know you are
not  a  zombie?".  Indeed,  Dretske  (2003)  showed  that  if  you  admit  the  metaphysical  possibility  of
zombies you meet some difficulties to justify the belief that we are not zombies. I will not develop this
here, but roughly the idea is that a zombie has the belief that she is not a zombie, just as we have. So
believing not to be a zombie is not sufficient to justify and so, to know you are not a zombie. If you
answer to  the question “how do you know you are present?” by the answer “because I  am not a
zombie”, the challenge is only moved because “how do you know you are not a zombie?”. As Dretske
1 I focus here on consciousness instead of life. Indeed, I believe that the concept of life cannot be of any help here. The 
usual concept of death only involves that we are located after the life of the organism. Past inhabitants are (in a tenseless
way) zombies, and are (in a tensed way) dead, for the very reason that the present is fixed on a time located after the 
instant of their death. If one disagree with that definition of death (something is dead if and only if we are located after 
the last instant of life of the organism), it means that one has to admit organisms that are dead during extended times, 
and, at the same time, indistinguishable from living ones. Socrates over there in the past, is dead during his whole life, 
with respect to the present. First, this is not the usual concept of death. Second, the skeptical challenge would then be: 
how do you know that you are alive? After all, if you have this very particular way of understanding life and death (the 
view that there is no way to distinguish between a living and a dead organism), you cannot be sure that you are alive. 
Hence, regarding this problem, I cannot see how life could be a progress with respect to consciousness. The challenge 
would have to be met in the same way. To put it differently, in claiming that past entities are not alive, one can mean by 
that either that life is not what we think it is, and has nothing to do with biological activity (after all, Socrates over there 
in the past has a biological activity in the usual sense of biochemical activity), or more rightly I think, that with respect 
to the present, past entities are not alive anymore.
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writes:
I'm not asking whether you know you are not a zombie.  Of course you do.  I'm asking how you 
know it.  The answer to that question is not so obvious.  Indeed, it is hard to see how you can know 
it (2003, 1).
Here  the  situation  is  quite  similar.  The  skeptic  does  not  ask  whether  you  know  you  are
objectively present. Of course you do. The skeptic is asking how you know you are objectively present
if you accept no-futurism. And indeed, it is hard to see how you can know it. For these reasons Forrest's
answer to the skeptical argument seems to be flawed.
Another answer to the skeptical argument was provided by Tim Button (2006, 2007). In short,
Button  says  that  we have  to  take the relation of  real-as-of  a  time,  as  not  being  symmetrical.  For
example,  yesterday  is  real  from  our  present  perspective,  when  today  is  not  real  from  the  past
perspective of yesterday. In short, the idea is that Socrates is real for us, but for him, we are unreal. If
we were in our past, we would be “there” by being objectively present at the edge of reality and our
current present would be unreal. More technically Button clarifies the question “Is this time objectively
present?”  by showing that  there  are  two readings  of  the  term “is”,  a  tensed and  a  tenseless  one.
According  to  him,  Bourne  and  Braddon-Mitchell  raise  the  skeptical  objection  by  reading  it  in  a
tenseless way. The right question is “is this moment objectively present?” with a tensed reading of “is”.
This is the right question because it avoids the skeptical objection: at each time, necessarily, you are (in
a tensed way) objectively present. The skeptical objection would be raised only by understanding “IS
this moment objectively present” with a tenseless reading of “is”.
Now I am not very convinced by the answer and I think we can defeat this theory by using a
time travel  hypothesis.  Braddon-Mitchell  (2004,  5)  underlines  that  there  seems to  be  two kind of
logically possible backward time travels in the growing block view, a duality quite strange. I want to
develop this idea by showing that in each case there is something wrong2.
Admit that we start our travel from a time called t, and that we arrive in the past at a time called
p,  by some kind of  discontinuous teleportation.  First  possibility:  when we go back to  time p,  the
objective present stays fixed to the date  t.  In that case we are objectively past. And again,  all  the
skeptical objections against the growing block theory have to be faced: the future is not open anymore.
Or more precisely,  our future is not open anymore. Times after  t are objectively future and remains
opened. Knowing that we are indexically present is not enough to know that we are objectively present.
Button would probably not accept that reality behaves like that because of this tensed reading of  “is
this moment present?”. So let us have a look to the second possibility. 
When we arrive in the past, the objective present is now fixed to p. In that case t does not exist.
Here it corresponds to the tensed view of the growing block, because if the reality behaves like that,
you just have to answer yes to the question “is this moment objectively present?” with a tensed reading
of “is”. Independently of in which region of space-time we are, necessarily, we are objectively present.
In  this  tensed  view,  knowing  that  we  are  indexically  present  is  sufficient  to  know  that  we  are
objectively present, and we do not have to face the skeptical objections. This is that view that Button
would endorse to prevent skeptical objections.
But in this tensed view, time t has to exist because this objective future is a part of your proper
past. If you accept special relativity and the concept of proper time, something I do, the no-futurist has
to defend that proper past and proper present exist, when proper future does not. 
2 Jonathan Tallant (2011) shows that Button's view is not satisfying in a different way. I will not enter in this technical 
debate. What I want to do is to show in another way that there is something wrong with Button's view.
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In the situation I  just  described, let  us imagine I  meet  me when I  was younger.  How is it
possible that Young Me and Old Me just talk together? For Young Me, Old Me cannot exist, because
Old me is supposed to come from his proper future. A proper future that does not exist  simpliciter
according  to  the  no-futurist  hypothesis.  In  a  tensed no-futurist  background  such  a  talk  should  be
logically impossible.  But the time travel makes it  logically possible.  So,  tensed no-futurism is  not
coherent. Or at least, tensed no-futurism is incompatible with the logical possibility of time travels.
In both cases, the no-futurist is in trouble. One way to reject this analysis would be to defend
that this kind of time travels is logically impossible if tensed no-futurism is true. Actually I do not see
why it would be so. I agree that teleportations from a space-time slice to another slice are probably
physically impossible. But they definitely seem logically possible. If different slices of space-time exist
simpliciter, something like a teleportation from one region of the past-present block to another region of
the past-present block has to be logically possible.   
Now I will advance a new skeptic argument against no-futurism by focusing on its modal status.
4. The Contingency of No-futurism
The time travel I have supposed to block the argument of Button was a Wellsian kind of time
travel (Wellsian refers to the Well's novel The Time Machine written in 1895), with a teleportation from
one  region  of  space-time  to  another  region.  But  one  can  find  another  kind  of  time  travel,  quite
interesting: Gödelian time travels. I take the distinction between Wellsian and Gödelian time travels
from John Earman:
In what I will call the Welsian type the time travel takes place in a garden variety space-time – 
say, Newtonian space-time of classical physics or Minkowski space-time of special relativistic 
physics. So the funny business in this kind of time travel does not enter in term of spatiotemporal 
structure but in two other places: the structure of the world lines of the time travelers and the causal 
relations among the events on these world lines. [...]
[The Gödelian type] does not involve any funny business with discontinuous world lines or 
world lines that are 'bent backward' on themselves. Rather the funny business all derives from the 
structure of space-time which, of course, cannot be Newtonian or Minkowskian. The funny space-
time contains continuous and even infinitely differentiable timelike curves such that if one traces 
along such a curve, always moving in the future direction as defined by the globally defined external
time orientation, one eventually returns to the very same space-time location from whence one 
began (1995, 271-272).
I am not a physicist, and I will not pretend to be one. I will just make clear on what assumptions
I will rely to build an argument against no-futurism. Space-time is described by General Relativity.
General Relativity is based on mathematical equations and aims at describing gravitational fields as a
result of the interaction between space-time and matter. The equations are compatible with different
possible worlds. These worlds share the same equations but differ with respect to distribution of matter
and energy. In short, we have to look empirically at the world to know where the matter is and, hence,
have a clue about in which one of the possible worlds we are.
Kurt Gödel (1949, 2000) has proposed a solution to the Einstein equations of General Relativity.
Gödel's solution describes a rotating universe with particular features. Some regions of such a universe
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contain Closed Timelike Curves (CTCs), temporal loops (this is the funny business Earman refers to3).
For someone traveling in one of these closed timelike curves, the future would be the past: it would be
like walking on a uni-directional circle. As Gödel writes:
By making a round trip on a rocket ship in a sufficiently wide curve, it is possible in these worlds to 
travel into any region of the past, present, and future, and back again, exactly as it is possible in 
other worlds to travel to distant parts of space (1949, 560).
But the velocities which would be necessary in order to complete the voyage in a reasonable length 
of time are far beyond everything that can be expected ever to become a practical possibility. 
Therefore it cannot be excluded a priori, on the ground of the argument given, that the space-time 
structure of the real world is of the type described (1949, 561).
I take for granted here that Gödel is right that, first there are CTCs in these worlds4, and second,
these worlds are physically possible5. Originally, Gödel's argument (1949) was designed to target the
existence of an absolute time (and I believe he succeeds, but this is another matter6). But, what interests
me here is that, if the possibility of Gödelian time travel is admitted, the no-futurist has to deal with
another problem: indeed, in such a world, the future that does not exist is identified with the past that
does exist. If Gödelian time travel is physically possible, then it seems that no-futurism is incoherent.
Unlike our previous argument based on a logical time travel possibility, this one is based on a physical
possibility. Gödelian time travel is taken to be physically possible because a Gödelian Universe is a
universe with the same laws of nature as in ours, in particular with the same laws of General Relativity.
The only difference between our universe and a Gödel universe lies in the distribution of matter. The
distribution of matter in space-time is a contingent fact: it could have been the case that matter was
distributed in another way. But whether or not the future exists should not depend on a contingent fact
such as the distribution of matter. Gödel expresses this point as follows:
It might, however, be asked: Of what use is it if such conditions prevail in certain possible worlds? 
Does that mean anything for the question interesting us whether in our world there exists an 
objective lapse of time? I think it does. For (I) Our world, it is true, can hardly be represented by the 
particular kind of rotating solutions referred to above (because these solutions are static and, 
therefore, yield no red-shift for distant objects); there exist however also expanding rotating 
solutions. In such universes an absolute time also might fail to exist, and it is not impossible that our
3 One could ask how it is possible to have a time orientation if there is no absolute time. As I understand the point, the fact
that there is no absolute time means that there is no unique time. Any foliation of space-time depends on a particular 
frame of reference. However, it is possible to average the whole of “relative times” to cash out an average time. I 
believe this is what Earman means by “the globally defined time orientation”.
4 According to Earman (1995), this model is vicious, but “since the pioneering work of Gödel over forty years ago, it has 
been found that CTCs can appear in a wide variety of circumstances described by classical GTR and semi-classical 
quantum gravity” (1995, 280).
5 Hence, importantly, Gödel makes clear that such time travels are not practically possible, but merely physically possible.
Indeed, the required acceleration involves a tremendous and unreachable amount of energy, along a curve as large as the 
whole universe.
6 An anonymous referee rightly pointed to me that Gödel's worlds are already threatening A-theories, and that, for this 
reason, the challenge I raise against no-futurism is not relevant. I disagree here for one can imagine that one day, it will 
be accepted that there is a special foliation of space-time after all, with a special slice of space-time having the privilege 
of being the objective present (it seems unlikely to me, but it is not incoherent at first glance). But the challenge I raise is
wholly distinct from the question of foliation and has to do with the identity of the past and the future, with respect to the
globally defined time.
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world is a universe of this kind (1949, 561-562).
In  his  argument,  Gödel  is  focusing  on  the  reality  of  A-properties  (in  its  vocabulary,  an
“objective lapse of time”). Gödel expresses here the view that we might well be living in a Gödel
universe in which there are no A-properties. Hence, such a universe is an epistemic possibility. He then
goes on:
The mere compatibility with the laws of nature of worlds in which there is no distinguished absolute
time, and, therefore, no objective lapse of time can exist, throws some light on the meaning of time 
also in those worlds in which an absolute time can be defined. For, if someone asserts that this 
absolute time is lapsing, he accepts as a consequence that, whether or not an objective lapse of time 
exists (i.e., whether or not a time in the ordinary sense of the word exists), depends on the particular 
way in which matter its motion are arranged in the world. This is not a straightforward 
contradiction; nevertheless, a philosophical view leading to such consequences can hardly be 
considered as satisfactory (1949, 562).
Here,  Gödel  appeals  to  an  intuition,  the  intuition  that  ontology  should  not  depend  on  a
contingent fact. Before questioning this intuition, let us see how I take the possibility of Gödelian time
travels to lead to an argument against the two kinds of no-futurism:
1) Gödelian time travels are physically possible.
2) No-futurism is incompatible with Gödelian time travels.
3) There are physically possible worlds in which no-futurism is false.
4) No-futurism is not true in our actual world.
I take the passage from 3) to 4) as the main problem of the argument7. It is grounded in the
implicit assumption that if no-futurism is true, then, it is  necessarily true. This necessitarianist claim
gains  support  from  Gödel's  intuition  that  the  existence  of  the  future  should  not  depend  on  the
distribution of matter. But is this intuition enough to draw a conclusion? After all, we might have the
opposite intuition: the actual world might well  be a no-futurist  one, even if  some other physically
possible worlds are eternalist or presentist ones. So why should we believe that if no-futurism is true, it
is necessarily so? Why should we believe in this particular necessity?
Classically, metaphysical claims are supposed to be necessarily true (necessarily false), if true
(false)  at  all.  But  recently,  Rosen  (2006)  and  Miller  (2009, 2010) have  argued  that  a  class  of
metaphysical claims are contingently true (false). It is of importance to examine whether no-futurism
could  be  a  candidate  for  metaphysical  contingency.  As I  will  show, no-futurism is  indeed a  good
candidate for being contingently false (or true). However, I will also show that a contingentist reading
of no-futurism leads to some trouble, and hence, that it is not a way out regarding my modified version
of Gödel's argument.
Let us first have a look to some examples. Kristie Miller distinguishes between three kinds of
pluralism of concretes entities: first, nihilistic pluralism is true in a possible world  w, if and only if
“every occupied region in w can be decomposed into a plurality of simple fundamental particulars, and
those simple particulars do not compose any composite objects” (Miller, 2009). Second, “[u]niversalist
7 1), 2) and 3) seem to me to be quite uncontroversial. Maybe one might be tempted to deny that Gödelian universes are a 
genuine physical possibility (after all, it might be a mere mathematical possibility, a model compatible with 
mathematical equations). However, I fail to see what would be a physical possibility if not a situation compatible with 
the laws of nature. After all, a Gödel universe merely differs of the actual world by the distribution of matter. 
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pluralism is true in  w just in case every occupied region in  w can be decomposed into a plurality of
fundamental particulars, such that for any arbitrary set of those particulars, there is a non-fundamental
particular that those particulars compose”. And third, “restrictivist pluralism  is true in  w just in case
every occupied region in w can be decomposed into a plurality of fundamental particulars, such that for
some and only some of those particulars, there is a non-fundamental particular that those particulars
compose”.
Miller deals with more positions (three kinds of monism) but it will be enough to take the three
kinds of pluralism as en example of contingentism. The three kinds of pluralism are contingent claims,
or so argues Miller. A reason to endorse this view is that both of the claims are correctly conceivable.
According to Rosen and Miller, a proposition P is correctly conceivable if and only if P does not entail
a logical inconsistency when combined with a full specification of the information about the kinds it
concerns. The three pluralist claims are correctly conceivable in this sense, or at least, we have reasons
to  think  that  they  are.  Then,  if  one  believes  that  correct  conceivability  leads  directly  to  genuine
metaphysical possibility,  one has to admit a contingentist  reading of the three pluralist  claims. We
might  be  living  a  nihilistic  pluralist  world,  still,  other  worlds  would  be  restrictivist  pluralist  and
universalist pluralist.
Let  us  take  a  second  example  from  Rosen  (2006):  he  argues  in  favour  of  property
contingentism, the view that the metaphysical nature of properties is contingent. He means by that that
it is contingent whether properties are tropes, universals or something else. If we are living in a world
of universals, then, all the red cars (having the very same shade of red) share the very same property of
redness. On the contrary, if we are inhabiting a world of tropes, then, all the cars having the very same
shade of redness are instantiating different properties of redness, properties that hold a relation of exact
resemblance (see Armstrong 1989). According to property contingentism, some possible worlds are
inhabited by tropes, some others by universals. All the examples of metaphysical statements susceptible
to contingency are existential  ones. It is agreed that conditional metaphysical statements cannot be
contingent (Rosen 2006).
Now, no-futurism is a view about existence: existence in time. Hence, it is a plausible candidate
to be contingently true or false. There would be possible worlds in which no-futurism is true, while in
other worlds eternalism is true. In others again, it  would be presentism that correctly describes the
ontology of  these  worlds.  Or  maybe,  presentism is  incoherent,  and  there  are  only no-futurist  and
eternalist worlds. Or maybe again, there are only no-futurist and presentist worlds. In any case, even if
there are eternalist worlds, it does not imply that the actual world is eternalist too. So, the physical
possibility of Gödelian time travels is not, prima facie, problematic with respect to the possibility that
we are living in a no-futurist world, it merely shows that some physically possible worlds are not no-
futurist. At this step, one might think that endorsing a contingentist reading of no-futurism provides us
with a way to escape the argument. However, as I will show, metaphysical contingentism is a very
particular view regarding epistemology. Allow me to say a bit more about metaphysical contingentism
about properties, in order to say why it is not a convincing way to escape my argument against no-
futurism.
One main aspect of the dispute about properties is that this is a wholly a priori matter. There is
no ground to be found in natural sciences or in any kind of empirical knowledge for these claims.
Indeed, this is above the reach of any empirical test (it seems) to find out whether the two red cars in
my  street  share  the  very  same  property  of  redness.  Hence,  property  contingentism  relies  on  the
assumption that it is possible to make room for a new kind of a priori contingency. More cautiously, to
the extent that it is possible to gain knowledge of the nature of properties, this knowledge has to rest on
an a priori justification of a contingent fact.
This raises substantial issues with respect to the methodology and epistemology of metaphysics:
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indeed, metaphysical claims are supposed to acquire their justification on an a priori ground. If one
wants to know whether one of the pluralist views is true, one has to discover it a priori; if one wants to
know whether properties are tropes, one has to find it out a priori. It is not physics, psychology, or any
other  empirical  science  that  will  help  us  to  get  a  confirmation  of  one of  the  views.  Hence,  for  a
contingentist, some metaphysical statements are both contingent and a priori. If, at first glance, a priori
contingency is not an illegitimate notion because of Kripke's famous work (1980), it is worth noticing
that the a priori contingency notion needed by the contingentist is a lot more substantial than Kripke's
one.
Kripke takes the example of the standard meter. He imagines using the length of a particular
stick (S) to fix the reference of the expression "one meter" at a time t. Importantly enough, when the
expression 'one meter' was coined, S might have been longer or shorter:  S could have been heated or
cooled. Hence, the identity statement "One meter = the length of S at t" is true in the actual world but is
false in some possible worlds – in short, the statement is contingent. Yet, the length of S at  t defines
"one meter". The definition is available a priori by the definer. Hence, the definer can have an a priori
access  to  a  contingent  statement.  But  Kripke's  a  priori  contingency  rests  crucially  on  the  act  of
definition.
Definitional a priori  contingency is the only (contentious) case of a priori contingency now
available on the philosophical market. But metaphysical contingentism requires a stronger notion of a
priori contingency disconnected from definitional matters. The dispute over the nature of properties is
not supposed to be (only) a matter of definitions, in the same way that the debate about pluralism is not
(supposedly)  only  a  matter  of  definitions.  So,  metaphysical  contingentism  requires  that  some
metaphysical statements have to satisfy the three following constraints: 1) being discovered a priori, 2)
being contingently true and 3) not being definitional. Here comes a worry for the realist: it seems to
imply that these statements lack accessible truth values. Indeed, how is it possible to get an a priori
justification for a contingent fact? Definitional cases apart, discovering contingent facts implies to look
at the world. Such a look is not available in case of property contingentism, pluralism and metaphysical
contingentism in general.  It seems to imply that there is no way to ground the truth of contingent
metaphysical claims. 
A skeptical challenge appears again. How could we know in which of the possible worlds we
are located? By claiming that metaphysical statements are a priori, it is supposed that there is nothing
in the empirical world that can help us to know them. It implies that different ontologies are possible,
and  that  we  have  no  way  to  know  what  is  the  ontology  of  the  actual  world.  These  worlds  are
indistinguishable. Hence, property contingentism leads to some skepticism: the view seems to involve
that  it  is  impossible  to  know whether  properties  are  tropes  or  universals  (provided  that  there  are
properties at all) in the actual world. It is important to notice here that the skeptical challenge crucially
depends on the way we are supposed to get access to the truth of these statements: a priori. But is it true
that metaphysical contingent claims  always need to be known a priori?  It might seem at first glance
that no-futurism, contrary the various views about properties and composition, could be an ontological
claim both contingently true and knowable empirically8.
Hence, at first glance, there are two ways to understand contingent no-futurism: the view has to
be known either a priori or empirically, whether it is to be known at all. If it is to be known a priori, it
means that no-futurism, eternalism and presentism do not make empirical difference at  all.  On the
contrary,  if  it  is  to  be known empirically,  it  means that  the  views,  in  a  way or  another,  make an
empirical difference. Let us call the first view A priori Contingent No-Futurism (ACNF hereafter), and
the second view Empirically Contingent No-Futurism (ECNF). Let us consider first ACNF. It should be
8 I want to thank an anonymous referee for making me think about the possibility of metaphysical statements being both 
contingent and a posteriori.
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clear  that  ACNF  has  to  deal  with  a  skeptical  challenge  exactly  in  the  same  way  that  property
contingentism does. If the view is contingently true, and has to be argued for on a priori ground, one
could ask how we might know that we are located in one of the no-futurist worlds. A priori justification
would be the very same in both no-futurist and alternative possible worlds since the justification has
nothing to do with the world in which the agent is.
Here, it might help to compare the situation with the first skeptical argument. According to the
initial skeptical argument against no-futurism, if no-futurism is true, then we cannot know whether we
are located in the genuine present. But the goal of no-futurism is precisely to secure this fact: we are
living in the present, not in the past. In a similar way, according to ACNF, we cannot know whether we
are living in a no-futurist world. But the main goal of no-futurism is precisely to secure this fact: we
are living in a world in which the future is unreal. Hence, this is not enough to show that no-futurism
can be true. To secure our present location, truth-making for past statements and the open future, it has
to be shown that we are living in a no-futurist world, or to put it differently, in one of the no-futurist
possible worlds. We saw that there is a dispute over the possibility to offer such a justification in case
of the initial skeptical argument. Unfortunately, such a justification is also out of reach in case of the
contingentist skeptical challenge (being granted ACNF), because of the possibility of Gödelian time
travel.
What  about  ECNF? At  first  glance,  it  seems  that  ECNF allows  us  to  escape  the  skeptical
argument. If there is an empirical access to metaphysical facts, then, we might well be able to discover
a posteriori whether we live in a no-futurist world or not. The view is quite appealing since, after all,
eternalism and the B-theory are supposed to take some support from special and general relativity. And
indeed, it seems that these metaphysical views about time have to do with scientific enquiry. However,
I believe there is something tricky here. It is not because these views have to do with science that they
have to be  justified by science only. For instance, special relativity is taken to be incompatible with
special relativity, at least,  with the historical version of it.  But it remains possible to add a special
foliation within space-time, and to  endorse the view that  the special  foliation defines an objective
present. This is an  ad hoc move, of course, but not an incoherent one. Scientific theories are always
compatible with several ontologies, and, in order to choose between them, other theoretical virtues (like
ontological parsimony, theoretical economy for instance) have to be taken into account. We do not have
experience of the existence of the future, or of the unreality of the future. We have experience of more
and  more  particular  physicals  facts,  thanks  to  scientific  enquiry.  But  we  never  access  to  the
metaphysical realm itself. It seems quite difficult to understand how we could empirically get access to
the  truth  of  presentism,  no-futurism  or  eternalism.  We  can  never  get  full-blown  justification  of
metaphysical statements from scientific enquiry only.  Hence, I believe it is quite hard to understand
what empirical facts could count as a proof of a metaphysical view like no-futurism. Scientific facts are
at best clues or evidence in favor of metaphysical claims, never proofs of them. Now, being granted that
metaphysical claims cannot be justified merely on empirical ground, let us ask ourselves how ECNF
can answer to the skeptical worry.
According to ECNF, no-futurism is true in some possible worlds (including the actual one), and
false in other ones. There are eternalist possible worlds, but we might have evidence that we are not in
one of these eternalist worlds. However, first, as I said above, evidence is not proof, and we cannot be
certain at all that we are in one of these worlds. Second, it is epistemically possible that no-futurism,
presentism and eternalism are both compatible with the same set of accessible physical facts. Hence, it
is never possible (in neither ACNF nor ECNF) to know whether we live in a no-futurist world. In both
versions of contingentist no-futurism, it is simply impossible to know whether we are located in the
objective present of a no-futurist world.
At this step, one might be tempted to argue that I am asking too much to metaphysical theories:
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why should we expect them to entail their own knowability? Why should we expect a view to give us
ways to know whether this is an adequate description of the world? Here, I have to say that I do not
defend that a metaphysical view  always has to entail its knowability. Maybe in some cases, we can
judge a view to be good for various reasons (say its ontological simplicity, or its power of explanation),
and that, even if it is impossible to know whether the view is correct or not. What I claim here is that
no-futurism is not one of these views. We expect more from it, because it is supposed to be the more
intuitive view. And it  is  supposed to be intuitive because it  explains why  our future is  open (it  is
unreal), and why  our past is fixed (it is real). Hence, when a view gets its motivation mainly from
intuitions, that is, pre-theoretical beliefs, such a view necessarily has to entail its own knowability. But
as I showed, metaphysical contingentism about no-futurism cuts the road to the knowability of the
view.
To sum up, a no-futurist has only two moves available. A first option is to deny that a Gödelian
universe is possible, in order to stick with a necessitarianist interpretation of no-futurism. But then, she
has to offer an explanation of why a Gödelian world is not possible. The other way to go is to accept
metaphysical  contingentism about  no-futurism and that  we have no way to know whether  we are
inhabiting a no-futurist world. And then, no-futurism is not able to show that the future, with respect to
the present (classical skeptical challenge), and with respect to the actual world (contingentist skeptical
challenge) is open. But once again, the view was developed to secure an open future with respect to
both the present and the actual world.
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